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Background
In Internet environment, especially in the C/S model, it is crucial to authenticate both 
the user and the server when the user needs to access services provided by the server 
(Khan et al. 2014). The telecare medicine information system (TMIS) has attracted great 
attention of researchers to establish a convenient communication over the Internet 
between patients at home and doctors at a clinical center or home health-care agency 
(Kaul and Awasthi 2013; Wen 2013). A doctor can easily get access to his patient’s medi-
cal history from TMIS, and diagnose quickly without repeating physical examination. 
Besides, TMIS can save the patients’ expenses and time (Xie et al. 2014). However, it is a 
great challenge to preserve the security and privacy of patient’s information transmitted 
over the Internet (Xie et al. 2013; Siddiqui et al. 2014).
Related works
Wu et al. (2010) proposed the first two-factor authentication scheme for TMIS service. 
Since then, a lot of two-factor authentication protocols have been proposed (He et al. 
2012; Wei et al. 2012; Zhu 2012; Muhaya 2015). He et al. (2012) showed that Wu et al.’s 
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protocol could not resist insider attack and impersonation attack. And they gave an 
improved protocol using smartcard. However, Wei et al. (2012) showed that He et al.’s 
protocol failed to resist off-line password guessing attack, and they also proposed an 
improved scheme, but Wei et al.’s scheme has the same security defects. In order to fix 
the above drawbacks, Zhu (2012) proposed an improved scheme. Unfortunately, Zhu 
et al.’s scheme has been proven insecure by Muhaya (2015). Wu et al. (2012) proposed 
a password-based user authentication scheme for the integrated EPR information sys-
tem. Later, Islam and Biswas (2014) found that Wu et al.’s (2012) scheme cannot resist 
privileged-insider attack, off-line password guessing attack and ephemeral secret leakage 
attack.
It’s an interesting topic to improve security and computation efficiency of the authen-
tication schemes. Pu et  al. (2010) designed an anonymous authentication scheme for 
TMIS service using the elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). Chen et al. (2012) proposed 
a dynamic-identity based authentication scheme for TMIS. However, Jiang et al. (2013) 
showed Chen et al.’s scheme (Chen et al. 2012) cannot withstand impersonation attack, 
off-line password guessing attack and denial-of-service attack. Recently, Xu et al. (2014) 
proposed a two-factor authentication key agreement protocol using ECC. Unfortu-
nately, Islam and Khan (2014) showed that Xu et al.’s scheme (Xu et al. 2014) can nei-
ther withstand replay attack, nor provide the revocation of lost/lost smart or achieve 
strong authentication in login and authentication phases. In order to overcome the 
above defects, they proposed a new anonymous two-factor authentication protocol for 
TMIS. Recently, Zhang and Zhou (2015) pointed out that Islam et al.’s protocol has many 
security defects such as: (1) Any legal but malicious patient can reveal other user’s iden-
tity; (2) An attacker can launch off-line password guessing attack and the impersonation 
attack if he knows legal user’s identity. Zhang et  al. then proposed a new ECC-based 
authenticated key agreement scheme in order to fix the above security problems. In 
2015, Chaudhry et  al. (2015) also showed that Islam et  al.’s protocol (Islam and Khan 
2014) suffers from user impersonation attacks and server impersonation attacks. And 
then they proposed an improved two-factor authentication protocol for TMIS. In fact, 
Chaudhry et  al.’s scheme is insecure under lost/stolen smartcard disguised attack and 
off-line password guessing attack, for that an insider adversary can extract information 
(ri, h()) from the memory of the user’s smart card. As we generally use passwords which 
are low-entropy keys, the following attack is feasible in practice: suppose that PW ′ is 
the guessed password and li is the user’s identity, an insider adversary (e.g. a malicious 
server) can compute l′i = h(IDi||PW ′||ri); if l′i = li, then the adversary successfully found 
the correct password PWi.
As biometric keys can maintain uniqueness property, they can neither be forged 
nor guessed easily. Therefore, biometric keys have been widely adpoted in authentica-
tion protocols. In 2010, Li and Hwang (2010) proposed a biometric based remote user 
authentication scheme using user’s biometric key to identify the correct user. Li et  al. 
(2011) showed that Li and Hwang’s scheme is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack, 
and they proposed an improved biometrics-based remote user authentication scheme. 
However, Truong et al. (2012) pointed that Li et al.’s scheme cannot resist stolen veri-
fier attack, reply attack and man-in-the-middle attack, and they proposed an improved 
remote user authentication scheme. However, the login and password change phase of 
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their scheme is not efficient for practice. Later, Awasthi and Srivastava (2013) proposed 
a new robust biometrics-based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards in 
order to avoid the time-consuming exponential operations. Unfortunately, Dheerendra 
et al. (2014) demonstrated that Awasthi et al.’s scheme fails to resist online and off-line 
password guessing attack, and they proposed an improved biometrics-based authenti-
cation scheme for TMIS. In 2014, He and Wang (2014) proposed a robust multi-server 
authentication scheme using biometrics-based smart card. But Vanga et  al. (2015) 
pointed that He and Wang’s scheme is vulnerable to a known session-specific tempo-
rary information attack and impersonation attack. And they proposed a secure biom-
etrics-based multi-server authentication protocol using biometrics-based smart card, 
and provided simulation results of their scheme for the formal security verification using 
Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool 
(AVISPA; Lv et al. 2013).
Our contributions
In this paper, we show that Zhang et  al.’s protocol (Zhang and Zhou 2015) is vulner-
able to lost/stolen smartcard disguised attack and off-line password guessing attack. And 
then we propose an improved protocol using biometric keys (fingerprint, face and palm-
print, etc.) to resolve the security problems. Furthermore, we provide the simulation 
results of our scheme for the formal security verification, using applied pi calculus based 
formal verification tool ProVerif. Our protocol overcomes the weaknesses of Islam et al.’s 
scheme and Zhang et al.’s scheme, and has the similar efficiency in comparison with their 
schemes.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: we first review Zhang et al.’s protocol in sec-
ond section, and show the security weaknesses of Zhang et al.’s protocol in third section. 
Then, we propose an improved authentication protocol for TMIS is in fourth section. 
The security analysis of the improved scheme is given in fifth section. We prove the ses-
sion key secrecy and authentication property using pi calculus based ProVerif in sixth 
section. In seventh section, we compare security and computation cost between our 
scheme and other related schemes. We conclude the paper in eighth section.
Review of Zhang et al.’s scheme
In this section, we review Zhang et  al.’s scheme. There are two participants in Zhang 
et al.’s protocol, patient U and telecare server S. Table 1 shows the notations used in this 
paper.
Initialization phase
S selects an elliptic curve Ep(a, b) over a prime finite field Fp and a base point P over Ep(a, 
b). Followed that, S chooses a random number s ∈ Z∗p as his secret value, and computes 
Qs = sP, and selects a one-way hash function H(·) : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p, and publishes {Ep(a, 
b), P, H(·), Qs} and keeps s as a secret value.
Registration phase
1. U selects his identity ID, its password PW and a random number r, and computes 
l = H(r||PW) and sends (ID, l) to S via a secure way.
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2. Upon receiving (ID, l), S verifies user’s legitimacy in his database. If ID is a new 
patient, S sets N = 0, otherwise, U is re-registering to the system, S sets N = N + 1, 
and stores (ID, N, T) into its database, where T is the current registration time.
3. S computes σ = H(s ⊕ ID), v = σ ⊕ l, μ = H(ID ⊕ l) and stores {v, μ, P, H(·), N, Ep(a, 
b)} into the smart card, and sends it to U via a secure way.
4. On obtaining the smartcard, U stores the number r in it.
Login and authentication phase
1. U inserts his smart card into the terminal and inputs his identity ID and password 
PW. The smartcard computes l = H(r||PW), µ′ = H(ID⊕ l), and checks whether 
µ′ = µ holds. If not, it aborts the session; otherwise, it selects a random num-
ber a and a current timestamp T1. Then, smartcard computes V  =  aP, I  =  aQs, 
Ku = H(I ||T1), σ = v ⊕ l, D = H(V ||N ||σ) and G1 = EKU (ID||D). Then, smartcard 
sends login information m1 = {V, G1, T1} to U via the public channel.
2. After receiving m1 at T2, S checks whether T2 − T1 < ∆T is valid. If it is true, S com-
putes I =  sV, Ks = H(I ||T1), and decrypts G1 to get ID′ and D′, and checks if ID′ 
is found in the database. If not, S terminates the session; otherwise, S computes 
σ ∗ = H(s⊕ ID′) and checks whether D′ = H(V ||N ||σ ∗) holds. If not, this session 
terminates; otherwise, S selects a random number c and computes W = cP, J = cV, 
sks = H(ID
′||I ||J ), G2 = H(σ ∗||ID′||sks||W ||T2), and S sends m2 = {W, G2, T2} to U 
via the public channel. If T2 is invalid, abort, otherwise, smartcard computes J = aW, 
sku = H(ID||I ||J ), G′2 = H(σ ||ID||sku||W ||T2), and checks whether G′2 = G2 holds. 
If not, it aborts the session; otherwise, U authenticates S successfully.
Password updating phase
U inserts his smart card into the terminal and enter his ID and PW when he wants to 
update its password.
1. The smartcard computes l = H(r||PW ), µ′ = H(ID⊕ l), and checks whether µ′ = µ 
holds. If not, it aborts the session; otherwise, it selects a new random number r∗ and 
a new password PW ∗, and updates corresponding value in the smart card.
Table 1 The notations
Notations Description
U Patient in TMIS
S Telecare server in TMIS
ID Patient U’s identity
PW Patient U’s password
s Telecare server’s secret key
Qs Telecare server’s public key, where Qs = sP
Ek/Dk Symmetric encryption/decryption algorithm with key k
H(·) Secure one-way collision-resistant hash function
|| String concatenation operation
⊕ Exclusive OR operation
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2. The smartcard computes σ = v ⊕ l, l∗ = H(r∗||PW ∗), v∗ = σ ⊕ l∗, µ∗ = H(ID⊕ l∗) 
and replaces (v, μ) with (v∗,µ∗), respectively.
Lost/stolen smartcard revocation phase
When U’s smartcard is lost or stolen, it will request S for its revocation.
1. U chooses its new password PW ∗ and new random number r∗, and computes 
l∗ = H(r∗||PW ∗), and submits (ID, l∗) to S over a secure channel.
2. S firstly checks the registration credentials of U. If the credential provided by U is 
valid, S updates N as N = N + 1 for the tuple (ID, N, T1) to revoke the smartcard.
3. S computes σ = H(s⊕ ID), v∗ = σ ⊕ l∗, µ∗ = H(ID⊕ l∗), and stores 
{v∗,µ∗,P,H(·),Qs,N ,Ep(a, b)} into the smart card, and sends it to U via a secure 
way.
4. On obtaining the smartcard, U stores the random number r∗ in it. Finally, the smart-
card stores {r∗, v∗,µ∗,P,H(·),Qs,N ,Ep(a, b)}.
Weaknesses of Zhang et al.’s scheme
Through careful analysis, we find that Zhang et  al.’s protocol is vulnerable to off-line 
password guessing attack and lost/stolen smartcard disguised attack. The detailed analy-
ses are described as follows.
Off‑line password guessing attack
If an insider adversary in TMIS can extract information (r, μ) from the memory of the 
user’s smart card (Zhang and Zhou 2015). Generally speaking, password is not high-
entropy keys (Abadi and Fournet 2001). Therefore, the following attack is feasible in 
practice. Suppose that PW ′ is the guessed password, and an insider adversary (e.g. the 
user’s colleague or malicious server) may know the user’s identity easily.
The insider adversary in TMIS who knows ID can compute l′ = H(r||PW ′), 
µ′ = H(ID⊕ l′) = H(ID⊕H(r||PW ′)), and checks whether µ′ = µ holds. If it is true, 
the insider adversary has guessed the correct password. Otherwise, it repeatedly guesses 
a new password until he succeeds.
Failure to provide the revocation of lost/stolen smartcard
Though the Zhang et al.’s scheme has lost/stolen smartcard revocation phase, an insider 
adversary can still use the lost/stolen smartcard to pass through the authentication pro-
cess. The reason is that σ = H(s⊕ ID) and ID in the new smart card are the same as that 
of the lost/stolen smartcard, and N = N +  1, according to off-line password guessing 
attack, the adversary can easily get PW and compute the correct authentication request 
message m1 = {V, G, T1}, which can pass the authentication of the server.
The improved scheme
In our improved scheme, {s,Ep(a, b),P,H(·),Qs} are the same as that of Zhang et  al.’s 
scheme.
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Registration phases
When a user U wants to become a legal user, he should register to S as follows.
1. U selects his identity ID, password PW and a random number r, and computes 
l = H(r||PW ), and sends (ID, l) to S via a secure way.
2. Upon receiving (ID, l), S verifies user’s legitimacy in his database. If ID is a new 
patient, S sets N = 0, otherwise, U is re-registering to the system, S sets N = N + 1, 
and stores the tuple (ID, N, Nc) to its database, where Nc is the identity of the smart 
card.
3. S computes α = H(s⊕ ID), β = α ⊕ l and stores {β ,P,H(·),Qs,N ,Nc,Ep(a, b)} into 
the smart card, and sends it to U via a secure way.
4. On obtaining the smartcard, U scans and enters his personal biometrics Bio. It is 
worth mentioning that no one can get Bio except U and the biometrics scan-
ner can be combined in the smart card reader. U computes µ = r ⊕H(Bio), 
θ = H(ID||PW ||r), U stores (µ, θ) in the smart card.
Login and authentication phases
In this phase, the user U and the server S can be authenticated each other and establish 
the session key sk, which showed in Algorithm 1.
1. U inserts his smart card into the terminal and inputs his identity ID, password PW 
and Bio. The smartcard computes r′ = µ⊕H(Bio), θ ′ = H(r′||PW ||ID), and checks 
whether θ ′ = θ holds. If not, it aborts the session; otherwise, it selects two random 
numbers a and N1. Then, smartcard computes V  =  aP, I  =  aQs, Ku = H(I ||N1), 
α = β ⊕ l, γ = H(V ,N ,N1,α,Nc) and G1 = EKU (ID||N1||γ ||Nc). Then, smartcard 
sends login information m1 = {V, G1, N1} to S via the public channel.
2. After receiving m1, S checks whether N1 is a fresh nonce or not. If it is true, S com-
putes I = sV, Ks = H(I ||N1), and decrypts G1 to get ID′, Nc, γ and N1, and checks 
whether or not ID′ is found in the database. If not, S terminates the session; oth-
erwise, S computes α∗ = H(s⊕ ID), γ ∗ = H(V ,N ,N1,α∗,Nc), and checks whether 
γ ∗ = γ holds. If is not true, S terminates the session; otherwise, it selects two random 
numbers c and N2 for computing W = cP, J = cV, K = H(J ||N2)G2 = EK (Qs||N2), 
sk = H(ID′||Qs||I ||J ||N1||N2), and S sends m2  =  {W, G2, N2} to U via the public 
channel. If N2 is not a fresh nonce number, abort, otherwise, smartcard computes 
J = aW, K = H(J ||N2), and decrypts G2 to get Qs and N2, and checks whether or not 
Q′s = Qs holds. If not, smartcard terminates the session; otherwise, U authenticates S 
successfully, and computes sk = H(ID||Qs||I ||J ||N1||N2).
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Algorithm 1 Login and authentication phases
Password updating phases
U inserts his smart card into the terminal and enter his ID and PW when he wants to 
update its password.
1. The smartcard computes r′ = µ⊕H(Bio), l = H(PW ||r′), θ = H(ID||PW ||r′) and 
checks whether θ ′ = θ holds. If not, it aborts the session; otherwise, it selects a new 
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random number r∗ and a new password PW ∗, and updates corresponding value in 
the smart card.
2. The smartcard computes µ∗ = r∗ ⊕H(Bio), θ∗ = H(ID||PW ∗||r∗) and replaces (μ, 
θ) with (µ∗, θ∗).
Lost/stolen smartcard revocation phases
When U’s smartcard is lost or stolen, it will request S for its revocation.
1. U chooses its new password PW ∗ and new random number r∗, and com-
putes l∗ = H(r∗||PW ∗), µ∗ = r∗ ⊕H(Bio), θ∗ = H(ID||PW ∗||r∗) and submits 
(ID, l∗,µ∗, θ∗) to S over a secure channel.
2. S checks the registration credentials of U. If the credential provided by U is valid, S 
updates N as N = N + 1 for the tuple (ID, N, Nc) to revoke the smartcard, and deletes 
Nc from his database and selects a new smartcard number Nnew for U, and returns 
the tuple (ID, N, Nnew) to his database.
3. S computes α = H(s⊕ ID), β∗ = α ⊕ l∗, θ∗ = H(ID||PW ||r∗), and stores 
{β∗,P,H(·),Qs,N ,Nnew ,Ep(a, b)} into the smart card, and sends it to U via a secure 
way.
4. On obtaining the smartcard, U stores (µ∗, θ∗) in it. Finally, the smartcard stores 
{θ∗,µ∗,β∗,P,H(·),Qs,N ,Nnew ,Ep(a, b)}.
Security analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the improved protocol. The following attacks 
assume that a malicious adversary can eavesdrop, modify, insert, or delete any messages 
transmitted via public channel.
The improved protocol can achieve mutual authentication
As V = aP, I = aQs, Ku = H(I ||N1), and G1 = EKU (ID||N1||γ ||Nc), only the legal user U 
can get the secret value (I, N1) to generate a legal G1. S decrypts G1 and checks whether 
ID′ = ID holds. If it is true, S can authenticate U, otherwise, U cannot be authenticated 
by S. On the other hand, U can authenticate S by verifying whether Q′s = Qs hold. As a 
result, our protocol achieves the mutual authentication.
Malicious insider impersonation attack
Login phase: If a malicious user UA wants to impersonate U, he must forge a valid 
login message {V ∗,G∗
1




∗||N1||γ ||Nc), however, UA can not get I, such that it has to forge an invalid 




∗||N1||γ ||Nc), but the equation ID∗ = ID does not hold, therefore, S will 
reject the login request. Thus, our scheme can resist insider impersonation attack.
Off‑line password guessing attack
If a malicious attacker has stolen user’s smart card, then he can extract the infor-
mation {θ, μ, β, P, H(·), N, Qs, Ep(a, b)} from the smart card, where µ = r ⊕H(Bio), 
θ = H(ID||PW ||r), l = H(r||PW ). Since r is protected by Bio and PW is protected by 
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a one-way hash function, the attacker cannot know both of the real identity ID and the 
correct password PW. It is impossible to guess these two parameters correctly in pol-
ynomial time. Therefore, our protocol is secure against the off-line password guessing 
attack.
Strong replay attack
If a malicious attacker wants to replay a previously transmitted message of the sender or 
the receiver, the attack will fail since U and S choose different random numbers (N1, N2) 







} using a valid nonce N1, the attacker can neither verify its validness nor 
obtain the session key assuming the intractability of Diffie–Hellman problem.
Lost/stolen smartcard attack
When the attacker attempts to insert the lost smart card into the device, it can’t pass the 
authentication of the server, since the stolen card’s Nc is updated in the database of S.
Perfect forward secrecy
In our protocol, the session key is sk = H(ID||Qs||I ||J ||N1||N2), where I = aQs = asP, 
J = cV = caP. Since a and c are random numbers chosen by U and S, their values are 
changed in each session run. Therefore, our protocol can provide perfect forward 
secrecy.
Formal verification
Some formal verification tools are used to prove the security of cryptographic protocols, 
such as BAN logic, AVISPA and ProVerif (Abadi et al. 2009). In this section, we prove 
the session key secrecy and authentication using formal verification tool ProVerif, which 
is based on applied pi calculus (Abadi and Fournet 2001). The reason is that ProVerif is 
performed automatically, and the errors can be detected easily, while the formal security 
proof is artificial structured, and the errors may not easy to be found.
The ProVerif code for the definition of functions, reduction, equation, free names and 
constants is as follows.
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We perform the above process in the latest version 1.88 of ProVerif. The performance 
results as shown in the Fig. 1. The experimental results show that our scheme is security.
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Security and computation cost comparisons
The security comparison between our scheme and other recently proposed related 
schemes are given in Table 2.
Let Tm be the time complexity of point multiplication in a group, Ta be the time com-
plexity of point addition in a group, Ts be a symmetric key encryption/decryption opera-
tion and Th be a one-way hash operation. Table 3 illustrates the average running times of 
some commonly used operations estimated by Kilinc and Yanik (2014), and shows that 
point multiplication in a group is slower than point addition, hash function and symmet-
ric encryption/decryption operation.
Since Islam et al.’s scheme (Islam and Khan 2014) and Zhang et  al.’s scheme (Zhang 
and Zhou 2015) are more efficient than other schemes. Therefore, in this section, we 
only present the computation comparison between our scheme and Islam et  al.’s and 
Zhang et  al.’s schemes, and very recently proposed related schemes, which showed in 
Table 4. From Table 4, we can see that our protocol is almost efficient than that of Zhang 
et  al.’s and Islam et  al.’s schemes. However, our protocol overcomes the weaknesses of 
Islam et al.’s and Zhang et al.’s schemes.
If the scheme can prevent the attack or satisfy the property, the symbol ‘Y’ is used. 
Otherwise, the symbol ‘N’ is used.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that Zhang et  al.’s protocol cannot achieve some secure 
properties, including security against off-line password guessing attacks, and it fails to 
provide the revocation of lost/stolen smartcard. Technically, we adopt random numbers 
Fig. 1 The performance result
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Table 3 The running time of different operations
Operations Point multiplication Point addition Hash function Symmetric  
encryption/decryption
Time (ms) 2.226 0.0288 0.0023 0.0046
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based authentication mechanism, instead of the timestamps that may cause time syn-
chronization problem. An improved protocol is proposed in order to overcome those 
weaknesses. The simulation results show that when compared with existing protocols, 
our protocol provides the same level of efficiency and better security guarantees for 
TMIS applications.
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